On March 21, 2001, after nearly a month of pondering on the arrest of double (FBI–KGB) agent Robert Hanssen on charges that he spied for the Kremlin bureaucrats for more than 15 years, the White House bureaucrats have ordered four diplomats, assigned to the Russian embassy in Washington to leave the country within 10 days, though no Russian diplomats, allegedly involved in the case, were arrested along with Mr. Hanssen. Secretary of State Colin Powell, meeting with Russian ambassador Yuri Ushakov, described those banned diplomats as “intelligence” officers working undercover as diplomats. Two other Russian diplomats, also linked to this spy-case, had already left the United States. Moreover, 46 other Russians assigned to the embassy and to consulates across the United States were told to depart by July 1 in order to reduce the Russian “intelligence” presence in the US.

The last case in which the federal bureaucrats ordered the expulsion of a Russian diplomat was in December 1999. In that case, Stanislav Grusev was ordered to leave the country after being arrested outside the State Department building with electronic equipment for monitoring a listening device hidden in a conference room.

The decision to order the expulsions was reached after several weeks of pondering over what is the best response to the espionage case that involves Mr. Hanssen, who has worked for the FBI for 25 years and for the KGB – for 15 years. Mr. Hanssen, the father of six children, lived in a modest home, drove old cars and enjoyed no obvious luxuries, although, as prosecutors said in court papers, he had a Swiss bank account. They argued that Mr. Hanssen should not be released on bail because the bank account was maintained at Credit Suisse in Zurich and because the statement was found in his briefcase at his home along with other financial documents and a valid passport that suggest he was ready to flee on short notice. The prosecutors did not reveal the amount of money in Hanssen’s account, though suggesting that it was not much. As an FBI employee, he has been a counter-“intelligence” expert. Prosecutors alleged that Mr. Hanssen began spying for Kremlin bureaucrats in October 1985 and handed over many important American “intelligence” secrets.

Technically, Mr. Hanssen was not charged with treason -- only with espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage for allegedly passing classified information to a foreign power, because “treason” is a separate crime of passing secret military information to a country at war with the United States.

Justice Department bureaucrats have not said whether they will seek the death penalty. Mr. Hanssen said through his lawyer that he would plead not guilty to the espionage charges.

Instead of acting immediately after Mr. Hanssen's arrest, the White House bureaucrats preferred ‘to sleep on it’ because they “needed to make a hard assessment of the costs and benefits,” and the latter probably outweighed the former in the view of the present round of diplomatic expulsions. Although the White House bureaucrats might consider whether to target a small number of senior Russian spies or larger numbers including lower-level diplomats, they preferred the latter way.

American bureaucrats acknowledge that Mr. Hanssen has volunteered to supply the Russian bureaucrats with information, but they blame the Russians for taking him on their pay roll, probably because the Russians did not report such a hiring. In addition, it is probably from this Superiority Complex that Powell’s response to the Russian retaliatory expulsion the CIA agents from Moscow was derived, when he sheepishly said, “We do not think there was a need for them to reciprocate. We thought we were doing what was appropriate”.

The latest move of the White House bureaucrats appears to be the largest diplomatic expulsion since 1986, when they demanded a series of steep reductions in the Soviet diplomatic presence in the United States. The diplomatic expulsion that followed the arrest of the double (CIA-KGB) agent Aldrich Ames in 1994 was comparatively minor. Back then, only one Russian diplomat (the head of the Russian spies in Washington) was expelled; and in response, the Russians expelled the CIA head of spies in Moscow.

The tone of Baker-Cheney-Bush's bureaucrats toward the Kremlin bureaucrats have become increasingly hostile, and recently, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accused the Kremlin bureaucrats of heavy involvement in spreading weapons to the “dangerous” national bureaucracies -- dangerous, of course, to the American “compassionate conservativists” and their profits off those nations. A deputy of Defense Secretary, P. Wolfowitz, said that "the Russians seem to be willing to sell anything to anyone for money." The Kremlin bureaucrats angrily responded that the charges were reminiscent of the Cold War.

A former FBI agent Skip Brandon told NBC News that the nations of the former Soviet Union now have more spies here than during the Cold War, with a main task — to steal American high-tech secrets. "Many of the people who are collecting here now, intelligence officers from Russia, are involved in economic espionage, targeting as to US industries and companies".

Normally these diplomatic expulsions end up as a tit-for-tat situation. However, the present round of retaliatory expulsions could hurt American bureaucrats relatively more than the Russians, since the number of the CIA operatives working over-the-counter in Russia is smaller than the number of Russian agents of the same status in the United States. Over-the-counter agents facilitate the work of those of under-the-counter, but they cannot work more than 24 hours a day. As a result, the CIA bureaucrats have frequently opposed expulsion of Russian diplomats, out of a fear of launching a mutually destructive "persona non grata" (PNG) war.

In spite of such warnings, the present round of retaliatory expulsions has begun less than a week after the first visit to Washington by Sergey Ivanov, the head of Russian Security Council, who met with Powell and the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, during which the alleged spy-case was discussed. Powell, speaking at the National Newspaper Association meeting in Washington, said, “Our relationship continues, and we’ll see what we can do to isolate this one incident, but we are waiting to see about the totality of Russia’s response.”

The expulsion decision seems to represent a departure from the Clinton bureaucrats' more respectful and engaging approach toward the Russian and Chinese bureaucrats. It follows years of growing frustration of the FBI bureaucrats about the revival and expanding of the Russian and Chinese spy-net in the United States. Although the number of formal Russian spies in the US declined briefly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the FBI and CIA bureaucrats now estimate the Russian spy-net is back near cold war levels. For the most part, Russian spies are attached to the Russian embassy in Washington, the Russian consulate and United Nations mission in New York, and the Russian consulate in San Francisco. According to the official Diplomatic List published by the Department of State, the Russian embassy in Washington at the beginning of 2001 had 114 diplomats, most of who are also the FSB (former KGB) agents.

On March 22, at the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that he did not believe UN employees of Russian nationality were involved. Russian ambassador to the UN, Sergey Lavrov, said he had not been approached "formally or informally" about any diplomats in his mission.

On March 23, four American spy-diplomats were expelled from Moscow. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin, the head of Kremlin bureaucracy, downplayed a spy outrage of the American bureaucrats, stating that tit-for-tat expulsions of spy-diplomats will be extended to additional 46, who probably will leave Moscow by the summer. On one hand, Mr. Putin, attending a European Union summit in Stockholm, said he did not think this tag of war on the diplomatic front would have “big consequences” from the expulsions. On the other hand, his bureaucrats had been working out an appropriately "painful" response to the expulsion of four Russian spy-diplomats, as well as the demand that 46 others leave the United States by July. Some Kremlin bureaucrats called the move of the American bureaucrats as politically driven and a throwback to the Cold War, and warned that it could seriously injure unsteady relations between the former rivals.

Thus, Sergey Ivanov, the head of Russian Security Council, said on Polish state television during a visit to Warsaw on March 22 that, "We will easily find… a more painful form to the US than it was in our case" to expel American spy-diplomats. "We have time to think, to carefully pick from among more than 1,000 US diplomats in Russia, to choose those who are most precious to the Americans."

Promoting his budget, tax-cuts, and new missile program among senior citizens of Maine, Mr. Bush defended the ouster of the Russian spy-diplomats. He said, “We did the right thing. They can make whatever decision they deem necessary. Our country took the right course of action.” The message of the Baker-Cheney think-tank to the Kremlin bureaucrats, Bush said, was “that we will be firm and consistent in our foreign policy.” After angrily reprimanding Powell for his statement of political moderation and continuity toward the North Korean bureaucrats, after apologizing to Japanese bureaucrats for a submarine incident when 9 Japanese fishermen died, after demonstrating unconditional support to Israeli bureaucrats, Mr. Bush clearly showed to the commoners who he considers to be the friends of America. By “America,” Mr. Bush, of course, implies the American upper class and its corporations, the profits of who are more important to the White House bureaucrats than the peaceful co-existence of national bureaucracies around the globe. Rephrasing a chairman of the General Motors Corporation, Mr. Bush can now boldly say – ‘what is good for Baker and Cheney is good for America,’ but that would reflect the smallest of his problems.

On one hand, such a White House bureaucrat as Attorney General John Ashcroft told on ABC's “Good Morning America” that, “We always need to be vigilant that we have security risks, not only from foreign intelligence operatives, but we need to make sure that our own organizations are as risk-free as possible”. On the other hand, White House spokesman Fleischer downplayed the seriousness of the “spy-scandal,” by telling the reporters that, "Even in the post-Cold War era, intelligence gathering goes on — no one is surprised by this”. Moreover, Powell predicted that, "We'll get through this because the world needs a good relationship between Russia and the United States." So, what is going on? Is it the case when one bureaucratic hand does not know what the other does, or there is something more sinister?

To answer to these questions, we should look closely at the evidence of the alleged spy-case.

The FBI bureaucrats alleged that Hanssen uncovered to the Kremlin bureaucrats three Russian double (KGB-CIA) agents, two of who were subsequently tried and executed, and one – sentenced to 15-year of imprisonment but released in 1992 when Yeltsin and his team of bureaucrats decided that a “democratic” Russia should not have the political prisoners. Now that survived double agent lives in California.

Secondly, the FBI bureaucrats alleged that Hanssen compromised extensive US information gathering operations, including a tunnel dug beneath the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Hanssen is accused of giving Moscow 6,000 pages of secret US documents since 1985 in exchange for more than $1.4 million in cash and diamonds. He was arrested early Sunday evening (February 18, 2001) in a suburban Virginia park minutes after he had dropped off a bag of classified documents, prosecutors said. A bag containing $50,000 was waiting for him in a hidden location at a nearby park. Over the years, Mr. Hanssen turned over information about "dozens of United States government classified documents," including some involving the government's double-agent program, a study on the KGB recruitment operations against the CIA, an analysis of the KGB operations and "a highly classified and tightly restricted analysis of the foreign threat" to a top-secret American program.

The affidavit of the Justice Department prosecutors, nearly 100 pages long, provided an unusually detailed narrative account. Prosecutors included details intended to support a view of the FBI bureaucrats that Mr. Hanssen had a long career as a Soviet spy, listing the dates he had contacts with the KGB operatives, the texts of letters he wrote to Kremlin bureaucrats, the payments he received from them, and the nature of the material he provided to them.

Prosecutors said the FBI had secretly obtained the bulk of Mr. Hanssen's file from the KGB-FSB, which they said was in itself an FBI success in counter-espionage. The director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, said Mr. Hanssen's arrest was unrelated to the defection last October of Sergey Tretyakov, a Russian diplomat at the UN. Later, Justice Department bureaucrats confirmed that Mr. Tretyakov had no input into uncloaking Mr. Hanssen.

Mr. Freeh would not discuss how his agents learned of Mr. Hanssen's activities or why they had not uncloaked him sooner. Mr. Freeh also would not say whether Mr. Hanssen had ever been subject to screening procedures like polygraph examination, though lie-detector tests are routinely given to FBI agents who handle highly sensitive information and are authorized to deal with other countries’ secret services.

Mr. Freeh said Mr. Hanssen's activity "represents the most traitorous actions imaginable." He said his assistants had not yet determined the full extent of the damage because they did not want to risk tipping their hand by beginning such a review while the investigation was under way. Nevertheless, the prosecutors of Justice Department have managed to cook the bulky book on Mr. Hanssen in such a remarkably short time. Hmmmm?

It is evident that FBI bureaucrats are bracing for what they expect to be stinging criticism in the days ahead. Mr. Freeh said his deputies had agreed to the appointment of a high-level panel that will assess the extent of the damage and review security procedures at the FBI. William Webster, a former director of the CIA and FBI, and a friend of the Baker, Cheney, and Co, will lead the panel. However, securing his own chair, Mr. Freeh volunteered the outside inquiry into the FBI internal security procedures, and Attorney General John Ashcroft accepted his suggestion.

In their affidavit, prosecutors said Mr. Hanssen volunteered to spy for Moscow in October 1985 when he was working as the supervisor of a squad that was responsible for the electronic monitoring of Russians in the vicinity of New York. He sent a secret letter to Victor Cherkashin, the same diplomat at the Soviet embassy in Washington who handled contacts with Mr. Ames, a double CIA-KGB agent who was recruited by the KGB agents in May 1985.

In the letter, Mr. Hanssen expressed his awareness about some setbacks of the Soviet secret service and volunteered to demonstrate that he could offer valuable information. He identified Boris Yuzhin, Sergey Motorin, and Valery Martinov as the double KGB-CIA agents who had been recently recruited to spy for the American bureaucrats. However, by that time, all three had already been in a Moscow prison as uncloaked by Mr. Ames.

It appears that prosecutors try to clear up what counter-espionage bureaucrats have long said was a mystery that had perplexed them since 1989 when a covert investigation began into Felix Bloch, a State Department employee suspected of espionage. In their affidavit, prosecutors said that Mr. Hanssen compromised the investigation by alerting the Soviets that the FBI bureaucrats suspected Mr. Bloch of meeting in 1989 with a Soviet agent in Paris and Brussels. As a result, Mr. Bloch denied he had ever engaged in spying and declined to answer any questions and that inquiry of the FBI bureaucrats collapsed.

In their affidavit, prosecutors said that Mr. Hanssen, whom the KGB files referred to only as B, wrote articulate messages to his handlers that reflected his knowledge of spying, his need for anonymity and the risks he faced. Thus, in one message in July 1988, he wrote about his strict precautions to avoid detection -- "My security concerns may seem excessive… I believe experience has shown them to be necessary. I am much safer if you know little about me. Neither of us are children about these things."

Prosecutors of the Justice Department revealed that they had found statements from two Swiss banks (Credit Suisse and Bank Leu) while searching Mr. Hanssen's home and office. Moreover, they said that Mr. Hanssen never told the Soviets his real name, instead calling himself Ramon. They said he did not identify himself to the Soviets as an FBI agent and refused to meet face-to-face with his contacts. Hmmmm? He would not travel outside the country to pass information and did not appear to live a lavish lifestyle. Hanssen denies any wrongdoing and is scheduled to appear for a preliminary hearing on May 21.

The first charge of uncloaking three KGB-CIA agents is clearly a ridiculous one, because the double-spy Aldrich Ames was already sentenced by this same charge, and the Soviet bureaucrats were not idiots to risk their valuable informer and to pay twice for stale information.

What related to the second charge -- the federal bureaucrats organized a construction of a secret tunnel under the Soviet Union's embassy in Washington to eavesdrop, but they now believe (or trying to make us to believe) that their covered operation was uncovered to Kremlin bureaucrats by the double (FBI-KGB) agent Hanssen. The secret tunnel operation, which the federal bureaucrats indicated was run jointly by the bureaucrats of the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA), was part of a broad effort of the federal bureaucrats to eavesdrop on and track Soviet (later Russian) personnel operating over-the-counter in the United States. The tunnel was built under the Soviet embassy complex on Washington's Wisconsin Avenue, a hilltop location known as Mount Alto. The tunnel was designed to aid in a sophisticated operation to eavesdrop on communications and conversations in the Soviet embassy complex, which was built in the 1970's and 1980's but was not fully occupied until the 1990's.

In the mid-1980's, at about the time the tunnel operation was under way, the Soviet and American federal bureaucrats argued bitterly over their respective embassies in Moscow and Washington. The Americans accused the Soviets of spying on them through the eavesdropping devices that were put in the bricks, of which the American embassy was constructed. The federal congressmen were even considering a project to demolish the main building of the embassy that cost about $27 million, because it was impossible to determine which brick was bugged. Meanwhile, the FBI-NSA espionage against the Soviet embassy remained hidden from public view even as the White House bureaucrats publicly protested an operation of the KGB bureaucrats to lace the new American embassy in Moscow with eavesdropping devices. Construction on the new American embassy in Moscow was halted in 1985, and the White House bureaucrats protested that Soviet construction crews were imbedding eavesdropping equipment within the walls of the new chancery building. The disclosure that the American bureaucrats believed that their new embassy was bugged sparked Congressional hearings and criticism of the handling of the matter by diplomats and the CIA bureaucrats. At last, after considering tearing the entire embassy down, the federal bureaucrats decided to send to Moscow the American construction workers, who tiered down the top two floors replacing them with two new secure ones before diplomats (and spies, of course) could occupy the new facility.

The Soviet and American bureaucrats were prevented for years from fully occupying their respective embassy complexes as a result of that long-standing dispute between them, charging each other in thorough bugging diplomatic facilities. Soviet diplomats occupied their present residence since 1979, and some congressmen charged that they were using those buildings as espionage outposts. In the mid-1980's, some federal congressional demagogues wanted “equality” and claimed that the hilltop location would give the Soviets an edge in information gathering against their own buildings in Washington. They also wanted not to give up the old embassy building in Moscow, which stays on the top of a hill, from which the Kremlin is open to modern information gathering techniques. Therefore neither one of the two new embassy complexes was fully occupied until after the formal disintegration of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Current and former federal bureaucrats estimated that the tunnel construction under the Soviet embassy and related information gathering activities cost to the American tax-payers several hundred million dollars, apparently making it the most expensive information gathering operation that the double agent Hanssen is accused of selling out. Although the federal bureaucrats have never publicly disclosed the existence of the tunnel operation, they stated euphemistically in the prosecutorial affidavit in the spy-case that Mr. Hanssen "compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States government."

I could not determine from the prosecutorial affidavit when the federal bureaucrats started to suspect Mr. Hanssen as a traitor who passed the information about the tunnel operation and related activities that targeted the Soviet embassy complex. Nor I was able to find many details about how and when the operation was mounted, or whether it ever succeeded in collecting information, useful to the federal bureaucrats. But according to current and former federal bureaucrats, their belief that the tunnel program had been compromised was a factor in their decision to keep looking for additional spies after the 1994 arrest of the double (CIA-KGB) agent Aldrich Ames.

A secret investigative team was established to identify the source of a series of damaging information losses, including the tunnel and related activities against the embassy, that could not be explained by Ames’ betrayal. Other unexplained information losses (including other technical information gathering programs, as well as the 1989 disclosure to the Kremlin bureaucrats that the FBI bureaucrats were conducting an espionage investigation of a State Department bureaucrat Felix Bloch) also prompted the White House bureaucrats to begin a new mole hunt. That mole-hunt team played a critical role in the counter-espionage probe that led to Hanssen's arrest. The FBI mole-hunt team was a fair copy of an earlier CIA mole-hunt team that helped to uncover Mr. Ames. Nevertheless, Mr. Freeh suggested that Mr. Hanssen succeeded in eluding detection for as long as he did because he used his intimate knowledge of the FBI's counter-espionage techniques and spent hours at his office computer entering his name into classified FBI data-banks to determine whether he had fallen under suspicion. Mr. Hanssen was not suspected of espionage until late last year. Although the FBI internal security personnel have the ability to track each agent's use of FBI computerized crime files, Mr. Hanssen's use of the databases was never questioned. Hmm?

If the KGB bureaucrats could not check upon the identity of their informer and nevertheless paid him $1.4 million for a stale information or disinformation, then, a conclusion might be that Mr. Hanssen was in fact a triple agent. And I would not be surprised if Mr. Hanssen emerge in a couple of years from now somewhere in New Mexico, living on a witness program at a nearby golf course, and the American commoners would pay for his “silent” retirement more than they would for his speedy execution. Although Mr. Hanssen's “arrest” confronted the FBI and its director, Louis Freeh, an appointee of President Clinton, with a serious security lapse and one of its most embarrassing counter-“intelligence” failures in recent years, Mr. Bush praised highly Mr. Freeh, thus, compromising the triple play of Mr. Hanssen.

The FBI-NSA operation against the Soviet diplomats in Washington, like the KGB bugging of the American embassy complex, was designed to eavesdrop on electronic communications and conversations inside the facility. The FBI agents were covertly placed in critical jobs in some of the key contractors hired by the Soviets, and bugged the building using secret technology developed by the scientists, hired by the secret service bureaucrats, to pick up sounds inside a large building. The tunnel operation against the Soviet complex, designed to tap into electronic communications inside the embassy facility, is just one of many similar technical operations run by the US secret service bureaucrats, both during and since the Cold War.

Spies compromised several other covered operations, like that one at the Soviet embassy. In the 1950's, the CIA and British 007s dug a tunnel from West- to East Berlin in order to tap into Soviet telephone lines. However, George Blake of the British secret service sold out the operation to the Soviet bureaucrats. This covered operation had been extensively publicized in the Soviet press in the 1980s.

In the 1970's, using submarines, the American Navy scouts tapped into Soviet undersea communications cables. In 1972, they tapped into an undersea cable used by Soviet Navy bureaucrats in the Pacific, mainly in hopes of gaining information about the locations and routs of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. In 1979, the Navy scouts began a similar operation in the Barents Sea, tapping into a communication line of headquarters of the biggest Soviet fleet. Some of the KGB-FSB bureaucrats passed onto the reporters an idea that their nuclear submarine “Kursk”, which recently sank in the Barents Sea and became a grave to its crew of a hundred some sailors, because it accidentally collided with two American subs, one of which, shortly after that incident, was docked and repaired in a Norway port and another one disappeared without a trace. That is why the Kremlin bureaucrats determined to raise that sub from the bottom of the sea this year in order to go to the bottom of the problem. Although the cost of lifting it up will be more than to build a new one, the Kremlin bureaucrats hope to pass that cost onto the American commoners, who will pay the final bill.

In 1980, Ronald Pelton, a former NSA agent, passed the information to the Kremlin bureaucrats about the Pacific cable tap operation of his former bosses. However, arresting him in 1985 on espionage charges, the federal bureaucrats did not believe that he knew about the Barents Sea operation, which has been continued for years afterward.

In the early 1980's, the CIA bureaucrats have also conducted a secret operation, tapping into a communication line of headquarters of anti-missile defense system that is right at the outskirts of Moscow. That cable-tapping operation continued for several years and was branded as “TAW”. However, the federal bureaucrats now believe that a double agent, Edward Howard, compromised the TAW. Mr. Howard was fired in 1983 by the CIA bureaucrats, later hired by the KGB bureaucrats, and defected to the Soviet Union in 1985.

Mr. Ames also had access to information about the TAW operation and might pass it to the Kremlin bureaucrats. Apparently, he also knew about operation “Absorb,” in which CIA operatives attempted to identify the locations of Soviet nuclear warheads by hiding sophisticated nuclear detection equipment on a rail car that was crossing the Soviet Union. That operation also delivered little or no useful information.

Indeed, as current and former federal bureaucrats acknowledged, the value of information gathered from many of these high-tech and high-cost secret programs is mixed, and they are not sure that the Soviet embassy tunnel operation ever actually produced any useful for them information. Some of the federal bureaucrats suggested that technical difficulties, not the double agents, prevented the operation from becoming productive. That is the real cause of the present diplomatic PNG war, in which Mr. Hanssen’s case was only a pretext – a casus belli, if you will.

As Boris Labusov, spokesman for the KGB-FSB, said on Moscow television, “As long as secret services exist, there will be always a threat of disclosures of the people working for one or another of such services. There will be disclosures, but I would not call it a usual practice. When a spy scandal is elevated to a political level, it is necessary to understand who and what is behind it, who derives benefits from it."

And what are those interests and profits that are hidden beneath the present PNG war? An answer to this question we can find in the recent actions of the White House bureaucrats who started a radical review of all American aid programs to the Kremlin bureaucrats, saying that they intend to stop the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The review was initiated by the new National Security Council bureaucrats who have been critical of some of these programs of the Clinton bureaucrats. This review will likely change the way how the new federal executive bureaucrats spend more than $760 million a year trying to dismantle former Soviet nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry and trying to prevent the unemployed Russian scientists from stealing their products and selling their skills to the potentially hazardous (to the American federal bureaucrats) national and tribal bureaucracies (so-called rogue states and terrorist groups).

The Baker-Cheney think-tank considers such programs as the one of the Department of Energy's $173 million program, which aims to strengthen the security and accounting for fissile material at nuclear weapons storage sites, to be "very effective". Other programs deemed ineffective, like the more than $6 billion for 10 years effort to help the Kremlin bureaucrats to dispose about 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, could be sharply reduced or even scuttled.

The new White House (WH) bureaucrats adopted so-called realistic or unsentimental approach to the Kremlin bureaucrats, prompting the latter to accuse the former of being out of step with the times, intent on reviving cold war policies, and abandoning the previous WH bureaucrats' effort to treat the Kremlin bureaucrats as equal partners.

According to the reviewed policy toward the Kremlin bureaucrats, the WH bureaucrats will explore the "cost-benefit ratio" of each major program and how well it serves the “American national interest”. The WH bureaucrats will reconsider whether the Kremlin bureaucrats and the bureaucrats of other nations should shoulder a larger share of cost of those programs, and whether the programs should have a "sunset" provision to ensure they do not continue after their objectives have been met. The WH bureaucrats will also evaluate whether the Kremlin bureaucrats have been “sufficiently supportive” of those programs. The WH bureaucrats will also examine whether there are other programs that might better serve non-proliferation goals or better ways of coordinating the programs.

The WH bureaucrats consider the "scorecard" of the bureaucrats of Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction of Department of Defense, who received $458 million from the federal congressional bureaucrats in this fiscal year, as "pretty impressive." By the end of 2000, the bureaucrats of that office had de-activated 5,288 missile warheads, destroyed 419 long-range nuclear missiles and 367 silos, eliminated 81 bombers, 292 submarine missile launchers and 174 submarine missiles, and sealed 194 nuclear test holes and sites in Russia and other former Soviet republics. The American federal bureaucrats will also buy from the Kremlin bureaucrats 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, the equivalent of 25,000 warheads, and convert it to low-enriched uranium that can be used as commercial fuel in nuclear reactors. Since the 1994 agreement between the WH and Kremlin bureaucrats, about 110 metric tons of such uranium has been purchased and converted.

As you can see folks, the WH bureaucrats’ radical revision of policies toward the internal and external bureaucracies was the real cause of the present PNG war.

What this diplomatic war should achieve in the opinion of the Baker-Cheney think-tank of two dinosaurs of the Cold War:
--to put the Kremlin bureaucrats on defensive by checking upon their political flexibility and dependency on the American economical help;
--to tighten up own bureaucrats, whose morals became too “fuzzy” during the previous administration;
--to justify to the commoners and laborers the increased budget of the secret service and military bureaucrats.

That is why Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Freeh have agreed to use extensively polygraph testing to monitor the counter-espionage agents. Mr. Ashcroft told reporters that the Bureau's computers would now be audited regularly to check on any unusual activity of the FBI agents. Mr. Ashcroft said that he knew that polygraph tests were not completely reliable and estimated that about 15 percent showed a false positive. He also noted that they had failed to uncover betrayal of Mr. Ames, who passed at least one polygraph test after he became a double agent. "Nevertheless, I believe that there are applications for polygraphs that are important… The director and I have agreed that because of the national security involved and the risks involved and the very important consequences of the breaches, that we should elevate the use of polygraphs in certain cases." Mr. Freeh said that although polygraph testing might lead to the mole-paranoia among his agents, those who would refuse to do that might be transferred to other jobs or even discharged from the Bureau.

Can you see folks, where this spy-mania of the federal bureaucrats, taken jointly with recent school shootings and promoting among our teenagers a notion that to snitch on each other is a heroic behavior, may lead us? Is it not reminiscent of Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany?

3/28/01

P.S. On May 1, failing to clean up the Augean stables of the FBI and to stop the internal mole-paranoia, Mr. Freeh decided to take early retirement in June, 2001.